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Abstract 
 
 This paper studies the effect of entrepreneurial optimism on the renegotiation 
procedure outcome in the case of financially distressed companies. We model a three actor 
renegotiation procedure whit a realistic bank, an optimistic entrepreneur and a trade supplier 
(who is an optimistic entrepreneur himself). We show that optimism enables a renegotiation 
procedure even when immediate liquidation is socially optimal. We also show that realistic 
actors (banks) can exploit the divergence in beliefs with optimistic entrepreneurs in order to 
obtain premature repayment, while optimistic trade suppliers support the company since they 
believe that the project has great chances to succeed. Hence, we explain by this idea some 
empirical evidence over private renegotiation results and player’s behavior.  
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 Private debt renegotiation is a subject of great interest in corporate finance as it is a 
crucial moment in a firm’s life with great potential of conflict situations. In addition to this, 
evidence has been provided of some counterintuitive empirical results showing unexpected 
renegotiation behaviors of different actors. Indeed out-of-court renegotiations are quite 
common (according to Asquith and al. (1994) almost half of the companies of their sample 
have already avoided liquidation through a private renegotiation procedure while Roberts and 
Sufi (2009) estimate this ratio up to 75%). Also, the attitude of concerned actors within these 
procedures may differ. Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Franks and Sussman (2003) highlight 
two different renegotiation behaviors on behalf of financiers: banks would be quite strict and 
progressively retrieve their claim while trade supplier would bring up more support to 
distressed firms providing additional funds or postponing maturities. Moreover, some 
empirical studies such as Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2008) highlight that most of the 
companies concerned by a private renegotiation procedure have poor performances 
afterwards or are liquidated not long after the end of the renegotiation.  
 
 Several questions follow from these empirical facts: if the percentage of renegotiated 
contracts is as important what is the utility of initial contracts’ terms? Should banks be more 
selective over projects they choose to finance in order to avoid renegotiation or should they 
on the opposite encourage renegotiation procedures allowing them to impose tougher terms? 
How do we explain the trade supplier’s attitude during financial distress? Finally, are out-of-
court renegotiations desirable judging from the weak success ratio of companies being 
subject to such a procedure?  
 
 A rich court of literature aims to explain some of the points mentioned above and 
different theoretical arguments have been proposed to justify the concerned actors’ behavior. 
For example, Petersen and Rajan (1997) suggest that trade suppliers have better information 
than banks since they are more familiar with the sector and the specific market. Thus, they 
would be more able to control the firm and to recognize real economic distress. Moreover, 
they would attribute higher value to the firm’s guarantees since they can reuse or sell them 
more easily. Another explanation, proposed by Mian and Smith, (1992), is related to 
commercial relationships between firms facing financial distress and their trade supplier: the 
supplier may benefit from his role of lender in order to increase prices. Similarly, Wilner 
(2000) explains this empirical result through the commercial dependence of the supplier 
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towards his client. Finally, Vilanova (2004) justifies high concessions on behalf of the 
supplier by his weak protection in case of liquidation. The renegotiation behavior would then 
be related to the priority of the claim detained.  
  
 The goal of this paper is to propose an alternative explanation of these empirical 
results. The idea is to include in the analysis of different actors’ renegotiation behavior their 
psychological profile. A growing literature provides evidence of the existence of some 
psychological biases that are likely to influence actors’ beliefs and decisions. More precisely 
we focus here on a well evidenced cognitive bias, the managerial optimism
1
. We will define 
optimism as a psychological bias that induces individuals to make too positive forecasts 
about their future results and to believe that their chances of success and general positive 
outcomes are higher than the chances of their pairs.  
 
  Most papers that analyze the impact of optimistic bias on financial decisions point 
out negative effects of the previous on firm’s performance and the main victims of these 
effects are often financial partners or investors. As a matter of fact, in these papers managers 
and entrepreneurs are often considered as biased optimistic actors while investors are 
presumed perfectly realistic. This is explained by the nature of the managerial activity: it is 
argued that realistic or pessimistic individual would rather work for a fixed salary and 
wouldn’t engage in risky entrepreneurial activities (Busenitz, 1999; Cooper and al., 1988). 
Some even consider that it is optimism that explains the too frequent venture creation 
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) and their high level of failure (Hayward and al., 2006).  In order 
to illustrate different negative effects of optimism developed in this literature we can take 
various examples: Manove and Padilla (1999) show the negative impact of optimism by 
modeling an adverse selection problem where banks cannot separate optimists from realists 
based only on the value of collateral. Similarly Malmendier and Tate (2001) show that 
optimistic managers may overinvest, while Vilanova (2009b) argues that they might refuse 
constructive advice from their financers (venture capitalists). All of these papers clearly show 
that optimistic bias is harmful to the firm’s financial performance. A logical question would 
then be how do optimistic actors obtain external financial sources? If the entrepreneur’s 
optimism really have negative impact on financiers’ gain we would expect to have high level 
of credit rationing in sectors where optimism is common (in the case of start-ups’ financing 
                                                 
1 For a detailed review on optimism and overconfidence bias in financial and managerial literatures see 
Vilanova (2009a). 
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for example). On the other hand, it is interesting to study the specific case of financiers, such 
as trade suppliers, that are both financers and entrepreneurs. We can imagine that their 
entrepreneurial status qualifies them as potential optimists even when they have the role of 
financers in a given situation. If this is the case, we should expect that their beliefs would be 
closers to the entrepreneur’s ones and quite different from what a rational financier would 
believe.  
 
 In order to develop these intuitions, we model a multilateral renegotiation procedure 
with three actors: a perfectly rational and realistic bank, an optimistic trade supplier and an 
optimistic entrepreneur. This allows us to analyze the impact of optimism on the 
renegotiation behavior and more globally on the expected revenue of each player. Two main 
results are to be pointed out: first we show that entrepreneurial optimism may explain debt 
renegotiation in situations in which it is socially optimal to liquidate the firm. Second, we 
identify “winners” and “losers” from such a procedure as well as the reasons that justify this 
outcome.  
 
 The main contribution of this paper resides precisely in this “winners-losers” 
argument. In fact we highlight here the idea that realistic agents can exploit optimists’ bias 
and benefit from the “beliefs asymmetry” the same way that they would benefit from an 
information asymmetry. This could explain their reluctance to impose credit rationing and 
identify optimists ex ante. Moreover, we suggest by this idea that the main victims of the 
optimism are optimists themselves and while they subjectively believe to be winning they are 
objectively loosing.  
 
 To our knowledge, there is no other article that directly studies this problem. 
Optimism have been considered in “bargaining” literature from a different viewpoint: Ali 
(2006) studies a bargaining game in which certain players are optimists about their 
bargaining power and Dickinson (2006) analyzes results of renegotiation when some actors 
are optimists about the arbitrator's settlement preferences in a final offer arbitration 
bargaining. In our setup optimism concerns beliefs about the project’s final probability of 
success and all players are perfectly rational and informed about their bargaining power. Note 
also that we model a bargaining game with a limited number of offers, similar to the one we 
can find in Noe and Wang (2000) and in Vilanova (2007). 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model 
framework and the bargaining game. Section II analyses the results of the renegotiation 
procedure and the impact of the latest on each actor’s expected profit. Section III resumes the 
fundamental results and concludes. We propose some extensions of our model in Appendix1 
and 2.   
 
I.  General framework and the bargaining game 
1.1 Timing and hypothesis  
 
Suppose that an entrepreneur without initial funds wants to invest the amount in a 
project he is willing to implement. He decides to finance this project by credit and applies for 
two types of loan:  
 a bank loan of the amount  for a total repayment  due to the bank (B)  
 a trade loan of the amount  for a repayment due to a supplier (noted CC)  
 We suppose that both loans are long term, they are to be repaid two periods later, at 
t=2. However the bank has the possibility to demand a premature repayment at an 
intermediary date (t=1).  This is because at the intermediary date, the entrepreneur and both 
borrowers observe a signal (noted ) allowing them to estimate a final probability of success 
of the project. The signal can be good  with an objective initial probability of  and 
bad  with an initial probability of . Note that all the actors observe the same 
signal meaning there is no asymmetry of information in our model. However, there may be 
an asymmetry in the anticipations that agents form based on the observed signal. In other 
words, there might be an “asymmetry of beliefs” due to differences in the psychological 
profile of agents. Optimists’ interpretation of the signal would be positively biased while 
realists would make the right anticipations about the project’s probability of success. 
Based on this signal the bank can choose between 3 possibilities: (i) let the firm 
continue its activity without modifying the structure of its debt, (ii) initiate a private 
renegotiation procedure and demand partial premature repayment, or (iii) liquidate the firm.  
Finally, if the firm is not liquidated at date t=1, at the end of the project’s life (t=2) all 
the actors observe the total amount of cash-flows the project has generated, . If the project 
is a success, cash-flows are high  and both borrowers are repaid (at the initially 
agreed or the renegotiated repayment level). If the project has failed, no cash flows are 
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generated and the borrowers can’t be repaid. The firm is then liquidated and the liquidation 
value equals . Figure 1 resumes the timing of the model:  
 
t=0      t=1                    t=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Timing of the model 
 
 Having presented the sequence of events we will now make some further 
assumptions. First of all we need to define the psychological profile of each actor. As we 
mentioned in the introduction we suppose that the bank is a perfectly realistic actor while the 
entrepreneur and his supplier (who is an entrepreneur himself) are optimists.    
 
 Different actors’ beliefs will be modeled in the following way: we will note 
 the objective probability to obtain a certain result ( ) at date t=2, given the 
signal observed at t=1, and   player’s  subjective probability of obtaining this 
result. Suppose    and   , than we can write: 
 
             
                                     
 
The bank being perfectly rational her subjective relative probability of success is 
equal to the objective one. On the contrary, both entrepreneurs’ (EN’s and CC’s) subjective 
probability of success is higher than the objective one, showing their optimistic bias. 
Therefore,  can be considered as a measure of the player’s optimism level with 
The three players observe a 
signal concerning the quality 
of the project   and 
based on this signal each 
player calculate his future 
expected revenue. At this 
moment, the bank chose 
between: 
- continue 
- liquidate 
- renegotiate 
In order to finance a 
project, EN borrows 
from B and CC the 
amount of .  
The maturity of both 
debts is at date t=2 and 
the amount of the 
repayment is noted  
 
 
Final cash flows of the 
project are generated. 
If,  both 
borrowers are repaid the 
initially decided or 
renegotiated amount. 
Else, the firm is definitely 
liquidated and the 
liquidation value equals  
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.
2
 We will further note the bank’s expectations as the objective ones 
(without ^) and both entrepreneurs’ expectations as subjective ones (with ^). 
  
 We further assume that when the intermediate signal is good, it is socially optimal to 
let EN continue his project’s activity: , and the bank has 
no credible liquidation threat. Therefore, the good signal case is not interesting from our 
perspective; the focus of this paper is oriented to the renegotiation procedure for firms in 
financial distress.  
 In the case of a bad intermediate signal the continuation of the project is still optimal 
for optimistic players (EN and CC) but from a realistic point of view this is not the case. 
Based on her (realistic) anticipations the bank would actually obtain more revenues if the 
project is immediately liquidated than if she waits for final results. This means that the bank 
has a credible threat to liquidate when the intermediate signal is bad.
3
 
 
 
  
 This assumption is very important since it shows that in the case of a bad signal 
different profile players have different preferences. Therefore we need to consider a minimal 
level of entrepreneurial optimism: 
 
 
 Our model is focused on the situation where , that is the case where 
difference in beliefs is big enough to allow a renegotiations procedure between players.  
 
 Note also that we consider here firms which, beyond financial distress (modeled by 
the bad signal), have real economic difficulties since from an objective perspective these 
firms have a much too low probability of success. Immediate liquidation is therefore socially 
optimal and objectively preferable for all the players as soon as the bad signal has been 
                                                 
2 As we fix  we make the assumption that there are no pessimists in our model. This is easily explained by the idea that pessimistic 
actors wouldn’t engage in entrepreneurial activities since the chances of success are very low, they would be more likely to prefer stable 
fixed-compensation tasks. This assumption is consistent with most of the existing literature. 
3 Here we also make a hypothesis concerning the allocation of the liquidation value: it is implicit in the liquidation threat that the bank 
obtains all the liquidation value while other borrowers get nothing when the project fails. This suggests that the bank’s loan is senior. The 
unique goal of this assumption is to simplify the reasoning and we test our model without it in Appendix 1. 
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observed. However, because of their cognitive bias some actors can’t realize this and prefer 
to continue until t=2. 
 Indeed, the question of social optimality in renegotiation procedures is a very 
interesting one and a great court of academic research studies the different facets of this 
problem. Much less explored is the question of the banks’ behavior when its client’s 
decisions reveal biased beliefs. Should we expect from banks to be socially responsible and 
knowing that the project is not sustainable, liquidate the firm as soon as possible?  Or, on the 
opposite, it is more likely that banks would rather consider exploiting others’ mistakes? We 
can imagine that when banks observe wrong anticipations among their clients they induce 
these borrowers to make concessions and thereby protect themselves against risk. Manove 
and Padilla (1999) mention the idea of a “paternalistic role” of certain members of society 
towards individuals whose beliefs are incorrect. Though interesting this question will not be 
further analyzed here. The scope of this model is more modest: we only focus on the position 
of each actor in case of distress relative to their psychological profile.  
 We point out here one more specific feature of our model: the optimistic beliefs only 
concern the probability of success once the signal has been observed. This means that our 
entrepreneurs are realists about the probability to observe a good signal: 
. In the case of the entrepreneur himself this assumption has no 
influence on the results of the model. For CC, the only impact of this assumption concerns his 
initial expected profit equation.
4
 The effects of optimism that we will show below would be 
amplified if we introduce optimism at this level but no qualitative modification in results has 
been identified.  
 
At last we will assume the following inequality:  This allows us to 
avoid the case where the bank is systematically better off by liquidating at t=1. Also, this 
assumption means that the bank loan is risky (in case of liquidation the bank obtains less than 
the face value of her claim). We also suppose that the liquidation value decreases in time (the 
bank has an incentive to react as soon as she observes the intermediary signal).  
 
                                                 
4 The idea of introducing optimism only at the intermediary period is supported by the initial engagement theory. According 
to this theory, a person would confirm his past decisions even when they appear to be bad decisions. In the case of CC this 
would mean that his optimism about the project’s probability of success is related to the initial decision to finance this 
project; it is only once he has agreed to be implicated in this project that he becomes optimist about itsprobability of  
success. 
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1.2 The renegotiation procedure 
 
 We will consider the renegotiation procedure as a sequential game of three equally 
informed actors. Two bilateral bargaining phases compose this game: one between the bank 
and the entrepreneur and one between the entrepreneur and his supplier. 
 The first phase consists of the renegotiation between the bank and the entrepreneur 
concerning the bank loan terms. The first player is the bank who demands an amount of 
premature repayment and initializes this way the procedure of renegotiation. As a counterpart 
of this premature repayment the bank accepts not to liquidate the firm before the final 
maturity of the contract (at t=2).
5
 Facing this initial demand by the bank the entrepreneur has 
two options: (i) accept the offer, or (ii) negotiate the amount i.e. propose a new (smaller) 
amount of premature repayment. By choosing the first option the entrepreneur is certain to 
avoid liquidation. The second option on the other hand is risky because we suppose that with 
a probability of  there may be an immediate liquidation of the firm.
6
  If this is 
not the case, thus with the remaining probability of , the entrepreneur is the last player to 
make an offer. The bank can then accept (and the premature repayment amount is finally the 
one proposed by the entrepreneur) or reject (and then liquidate the company). The bargaining 
game between these two players ends here; the bank cannot make a second offer to the 
company. We limit the bargaining at this level in order to avoid the situation where players 
never get to a common agreement.  
 The first phase of the renegotiation procedure that we have just described is in fact 
directly connected to the second one: the bargaining game between the entrepreneur and his 
supplier. As a matter of fact right after the first phase, the entrepreneur demands additional 
funds to his supplier. These funds should allow him to provide the premature repayment 
promised to the bank. It is therefore quite logical that the behavior of the entrepreneur at the 
first phase of the renegotiation depends on his estimation of the amount of additional funds 
his supplier would be willing to provide. Since our model is a model of symmetric 
information during the first phase of the procedure the entrepreneur can anticipate the exact 
                                                 
5 As it is often assumed in this kind of models, strong covenants allow the bank to liquidate the company or renegotiate at an 
intermediary moment. In our setup, the bank is actually the only player to perceive an interest to renegotiation in the case of 
a bad intermediary signal. If the supplier had the opportunity to liquidate at t=1, this would change nothing to the model 
since the latest never considers liquidation to be preferable.  
6 Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) define this parameter as the cost of time while Noe and Wang (2000) name it the 
probability that the rent of renegotiation will be dissipated. In our case, we will simply presume that with a probability 
 the bargaining between the bank and the entrepreneur does not come off and the bank liquidates the firm. 
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amount that he will be able to obtain from his supplier. Actually, the bargaining game 
between EN and CC happens almost the same way as the one with the bank: the entrepreneur 
makes an initial demand and similarly the supplier can choose between accepting and 
bargaining. If he chooses to bargain, he knows that with a probability of  the company 
would be immediately liquidated and with a probability of  his offer would be 
considered by the entrepreneur. The latest can once again either accept or refuse this last 
offer. In the aim of keeping the basic model simple we add here the following assumption: 
the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power against his supplier  i.e. CC will never 
bargain. Knowing the limits of this hypothesis we resolve our model without it in Appendix 
2. The figure 2 illustrates the sequence of the bargaining game: 
 
Figure 2 : The renegotiation game 
 
II.  The basic model 
As usually for this type of games, we will build our model by backward induction: we 
will analyze first the results of the renegotiation procedure and then we will go back to the 
initial period and show the impact of the renegotiation results on the initial credit availability. 
 
 
Liquidation 
Amount of additional 
funds provided by CC at 
t=1: TCC 
 
EN refuses EN accepte 
CC  bargains 
Phase 2 : 
The entrepreneur makes an initial 
demand of additional funds to his 
supplier 
 
 
 
CC  accepts  
 
Liquidation 
Amount of partial 
repayment provided to B at 
t=1:  TB 
 
B refuses B accepts 
EN bargains 
 
Phase 1 : 
The bank makes an initial offer about the 
amount of premature repayment to the 
entrepreneur 
 
 
 
EN accepts 
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2.1 Results of the renegotiation at t=1 
 
 We remind here that the renegotiation process concerns only the case where the 
intermediary signal is bad . As we mentioned before the bank initiates the procedure 
of renegotiation by making the first demand to the entrepreneur. Therefore, first of all we 
need to determine the amount of premature repayment she would demand. The goal of the 
bank is to propose to the entrepreneur an amount of repayment such that the he has no 
interest in bargaining and he prefers to accept the bank’s demand. This means that when 
deciding this amount the bank will take into consideration:  
 Her own incentive to renegotiate rather than liquidate; 
 The amount of partial repayment that the entrepreneur together with his supplier 
would accept to provide; and 
 The bargaining power of the entrepreneur. 
First of all, the incentive constraint of the bank is:  
 
          (1) 
 
Based on this incentive constraint we can calculate the limits of the repayment amount the 
bank can ask for at t=1:  
- If  than the minimal level of premature repayment that the bank can 
accept rather than liquidate equals: .   
- If  this means that if the bank obtains this level of premature 
repayment her loan becomes risk free because her revenue remains the same 
whatever the final result of the project.  Beyond  an increase in the 
premature repayment amount changes nothing in the final revenue of the bank. 
Thus, the maximal amount of premature repayment that the bank would ask for is:  
  
 
 These two threshold amounts allow us to deduce the bracket of the bank’s initial offer. 
In order to decide the exact amount of premature repayment to demand the bank needs to 
analyze the level of concessions both entrepreneurs are willing to make. Indeed, even though 
the bank is in a direct negotiation with the entrepreneur only, she knows that the bargaining 
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decisions of her interlocutor are contingent on the supplier’s willingness to provide additional 
funds. In other words, in addition to the optimistic entrepreneur’s participation constraint, the 
bank should consider the optimistic supplier’s one:    
      (2) 
     (3) 
 
 At equality (2) and (3) allow us to deduce the maximal level of additional funds that 
EN and CC are willing to provide at the intermediate period. The entrepreneur’s maximal 
level of concessions is thus  and CC is willing to provide at best   
. 
 We now have 4 threshold amounts of premature repayment (  ,  
based on which we distinguish 3 possible situations in t=1: 
- : the sum of maximal concessions that the entrepreneur and the 
supplier can provide is not sufficient to dissuade the bank from liquidating. The firm is 
then liquidated at t= 1. 
- : the additional funds eventually provided by the supplier alone are 
sufficient to cover the maximal amount the bank can ever demand. Since we have 
supposed for this basic model that the entrepreneur holds the totality of the bargaining 
power against his supplier, he does not need to make concessions in this case (he would 
only transfer funds from CC to B). Hence, the entrepreneur has no interest in 
bargaining against the bank at the first phase of the renegotiation procedure and he will 
accept any initial offer coming from the bank
 7
. Quite logically the bank will then 
demand . 
- and : this example is the most complex one. As a 
matter of fact here the liquidation can be avoided but the bank can’t expect to obtain 
directly the maximal level of concessions. This comes from the fact that the supplier’s 
concessions alone are not high enough to cover the maximal level of concessions the 
bank can demand. In other words,  EN has now an incentive to bargain with the bank in 
order to reduce the total amount of premature repayment and therefore reduce his own 
                                                 
7 Note that by saying that the entrepreneur will not bargain when only the supplier’s concessions are concerned we implicitly 
assume that EN prefers the bank over the supplier. It is as possible to have a situation where the entrepreneur prefers the 
supplier and always bargains with the bank in order to reduce the supplier’s concessions. We tested both cases and we 
decided to keep the first one since it allows us so present stronger results. 
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concessions. As we mentioned above, the goal of the bank in this particular case is to 
demand an amount of partial repayment (  such that the entrepreneur accepts 
directly without bargaining. So she needs to assure that the expected revenue of EN 
when he accepts the offer of the bank is the same as the one he can expect when he 
bargains. But the gain of the entrepreneur from an eventual bargaining depends on his 
bargaining power ( , that is to say it depends on the probability to be the last player to 
make an offer in the bargaining game.  On the other hand, the entrepreneur who 
anticipates the level of concessions of the supplier can have two different goals 
depending on wheatear he can completely eliminate his own concessions and report all 
the partial repayment of the bank on the shoulders of CC or he must make concessions 
himself. In other words, based on his anticipations concerning the second phase of the 
renegotiation procedure the entrepreneur will distinguish two cases: 
1.) , the case where the concessions of the supplier alone are sufficient to 
avoid liquidation. The entrepreneur then anticipates that if he bargains and makes 
the last offer to the bank he will have no concessions to make himself 
2.) , case where the supplier’s concessions are not sufficient to avoid 
liquidation and the aimed premature repayment amount of the entrepreneur (the 
amount he can propose if he makes the last offer) is  
 This distinction, made by the entrepreneur, adds some additional parameters in the decision 
of the bank concerning her initial demand of repayment. We will note the amount of 
premature repayment demanded by the bank  with . In the first case 
mentioned above , the maximal level of repayment that the bank can demand 
remaining certain that the entrepreneur will accept should verify the following equality: 
   (4) 
The left hand side of the equation (4) represents the expected revenue of the 
entrepreneur in a case of a bad signal when the amount of additional funds that he is 
supposed to provide himself is . The right hand side of the same equation is his 
expected revenue when he bargains and gets to reduce the premature repayment to the lowest 
possible level, (  .  
By resolving this equality we can obtain the amount initially demanded by the bank in 
the first of the two cases above:  
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     (5) 
 The second case (  is similar to the first one. As we mentioned before, 
the main difference lies in the fact that the entrepreneur knows that if he gets to be the last 
one to make an offer he won’t have any concessions to make. We can than calculate the 
amount the bank will demand initially in a similar way. In order to be accepted by the 
entrepreneur this amount should be such that the following is true:  
      (6) 
 In other words the initial offer of the bank in the second from the two cases mentioned 
above would be
8
: 
      (7) 
  
 We can now resume all the possible levels of premature repayment to the bank in the 
following lemmas:  
 Lemma 1: If in t=1 1the players observe a negative signal and  
then  there is no renegotiation and the bank liquidates the firm. 
 Lemma 2: If in t=1the players observe a negative signal and  
there is a renegotiation procedure. The amount of premature repayment provided to the bank 
would then be: 
(i)   if the additional funds that the supplier can provide are high 
enough so that the entrepreneur has no interest in bargaining  
(ii) if the entrepreneur bargains and aims to reduce the level 
of premature repayment to the supplier’s concessions only .    
(iii)  , when the entrepreneur bargains aiming to 
reduce the amount of premature repayment to the minimal level allowing to avoid 
liquidation .   
 
2.2 Renegotiation results and optimism 
 
It is now interesting to see how the levels of premature repayment to the bank and 
their distribution between the two optimistic agents are actually related to their degree of 
optimism, .  
                                                 
8 Once again we assume here that the entrepreneur prefers the bank over the supplier. 
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First of all, we need to determine the level of entrepreneurial optimism necessary for 
the first period liquidation to be avoided through a renegotiation procedure. Based on Lemma 
1 we can see that in order to avoid liquidation the sum of both entrepreneurs maximal 
concessions should be at least as high as the bank’s minimal repayment level. We will note 
the level of entrepreneurial optimism satisfying this equality and we can say that the first 
period liquidation will be avoided as long as . 
 Lets us consider now the different possible cases when the renegotiation procedure 
takes place (  The point (i) of Lemma 2, represents the case where for a given level of 
debt, the optimism is so high that the supplier alone can cover the bank’s maximal premature 
repayment demand. By equalizing  to  we obtain the optimism degree beyond 
which this case is possible, that is  Thus we can say that based on the 
suppliers concessions alone, the bank’s loan becomes entirely risk free as the entrepreneur 
has no interest in bargaining with the bank as long as the entrepreneurial optimism level is 
higher than .  
  Quite intuitively, when the optimism level is between the two threshold points 
designed previously ( ), that is for an intermediate level of optimism, the 
entrepreneur has an interest in bargaining and the bank’s premature repayment amount is 
contingent on the entrepreneur’s bargaining power. However, inside this bracket we have 
distinguished two different bargaining behaviors on behalf of the entrepreneur. The 
distinction comes essentially from the level of concessions provided by the optimistic 
supplier and indirectly from the necessity of the entrepreneur to provide his own funds. Case 
(ii) of Lemma 2 designs the situation where the entrepreneur hopes not to make concessions 
at all. If he chooses the bargaining option he then offers to the bank only the additional funds 
he has anticipated to obtain from the supplier. The case (iii) concerns the situation where the 
entrepreneur knows that he has to bring in some of his own funds and his goal is to provide 
the minimum possible to the bank. In this case his bargaining incitation is stronger so the 
bank’s premature repayment amount is lower. This means that in the first case the bank 
profits from the entrepreneurs’ indifference concerning the concessions the supplier would 
have to make. The level of optimism allowing her to do this will therefore correspond to the 
following equality: . Note  this level of optimism, with 
. We can then say that even if the entrepreneur bargains in 
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both cases, the bank’s premature repayment amount is higher when  and lower 
when  
 We resume the different optimism threshold levels in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: When the intermediary signal is bad (s=b) : 
(i) If , the firm is liquidated immediately; 
(ii) If  there is a debt renegociation and the bank obtains a weak constant 
level of premature repayment provided by both the entrepreneur and the supplier; 
(iii) If   there is a debt renegotiation and the bank obtains a higher 
optimism contingent level of partial repayment provided by both the entrepreneur and 
the supplier; 
(iv) If there is a debt renegotiation and the bank obtains the highest 
possible premature repayment amount (her loan becomes risk free) provided by the 
supplier alone.  
 
The Proposition 1 contains two key results of our model: the first one is that the more 
the entrepreneurial optimism level is high the higher the premature repayment provided to the 
bank and so the lower the level of risk of her debt; the second is that the higher the 
entrepreneurial optimism level the less the entrepreneur himself brings in the additional 
funds. This means that the supplier is the first player to be expropriated and his objective 
expected revenue is negatively related to the optimism level. However, from his subjective 
optimistic point of view he believes that the renegotiation procedure results in, at least, a 
zero-sum game. Based on this we can directly write the following Corollary:  
 
Corollary :1 In a case of a bad intermediary signal  : 
 The subjective expected revenue of the bank is a positive non monotonic function of 
the entrepreneurs’ optimism leve;l 
 The subjective expected revenue of the commercial supplier equals zero for a weak or 
an intermediary level of optimism ( ) and it is a positive linear function of the 
latest when its level is high . 
 
 Note once again that the Corollary 1 concerns the subjective expected revenue of 
financiers. In the case of the bank this is not of great importance since the bank’s subjective 
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expected revenue is the same as the objective one. We illustrate the curve of the bank’s 
expected revenue based on different level of optimism in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 : Bank’s expected revenue at t=1, when she observes a bad signal (s=b) 
The grey part of the graph represents the bank’s gain when  
she renegotiates  her claim with optimistic agents  
 
 On the opposite, the supplier’s objective expected revenue is quite different than his 
subjective optimistic expectations. Because of his optimistic bias, the supplier is willing to give 
up on a part of his future funds and save the company from liquidation, option that he 
considers to be optimal since he overestimates the probability of success of the project. But 
from an objective realistic point of view the liquidation is the optimal choice for the supplier in 
the case of a bad signal. Thus, the more his willingness to make concessions during the 
renegotiation is important (the stronger his optimism bias) the more his situation moves away 
from optimum. He is therefore objectively loosing even when from his own perspective he is 
winning.  Besides, since we have assumed in this basic framework that the supplier has no 
bargaining power, his objective expected revenue is quasi symmetric to the bank’s one (he 
brings in the majority of the funds provided to the bank). This is graphically illustrated in the 
Figure 4.  
 On the whole, this analysis shows the position of each player when a firm faces 
financial distress: the realistic player (the bank) has a comparative advantage over the 
optimistic players and he will participate in a renegotiation procedure only if he is objectively 
winning. The optimistic players are, on the opposite, disadvantaged by their bias and they 
both lose in the renegotiation game. The supplier, by his willingness to save the company 
from liquidation, ends up scarifying the totality and more of his future expected revenues. 
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The entrepreneur, also a victim of his own willingness to pursuit the project, loses when the 
project is not liquidated but his loss is compensated by his possibility to expropriate his 
supplier.  
 
 
Figure 4 : Supplier’s expected revenue at t=1, when he observes a bad signal (s=b) 
The full line represents the supplier’s subjective expected revenue while the broken line represents his objective 
expected revenue. The grey part of the graph illustrates the objective loss of future revenues due to concessions 
in the renegotiation procedure 
   
 2.3  Credit grants at t=0 
 
 We now return to the period t=0 in order to show how both financiers could anticipate 
the eventual renegotiation procedure and integrate this information in their credit grant 
decisions.
 9
 We propose to study each financier’s case apart. 
 
A. The bank loan 
 Within our model framework we can write the initial expected profit of a financier , 
with   as:   
                     (8) 
  
                                                 
 9 From the supplier’s point of view the bank is too pessimistic about the project’s probability of success. He therefore 
anticipates that if a bad signal is observed the bank would want to liquidate if she doesn’t obtain a partial premature 
repayment.  
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 As far as the bank is concerned the first term of the right hand side of (8) is trivial: 
when observing a good signal the bank has no credible threat of liquidation ant its expected 
revenue is:  
       (9) 
 
 As we can see the entrepreneurial optimism plays no role in this part of the equation. 
Note however that our model does not take in consideration the impact of the optimism bias 
of the entrepreneur on his intermediary operational decisions or any other decisions not 
related to the renegotiation procedure. More generally, it has been argued that the optimism 
bias influence a great number of choices along the project’s existence (overinvestment, 
overproduction, non voluntary risk taking, etc.).  This could deteriorate the intrinsic quality of 
the given project and reduce its final probability of success even when the intermediate signal 
is good. For clarity reasons we have chosen not to introduce this aspect of the optimism bias 
in our model. Still, a more detailed analysis of the interdependence of different effects of 
optimism at this level can inspire some interesting further research. 
 The second term of the equation (8) is, in our model, the one that allows us to evaluate 
the effects of optimism on the expected revenues of the bank at t=0. It follows from 
Proposition 1: 
                     (10) 
 
 This equation not only confirms the positive impact of entrepreneurial optimism on 
the bank’s expected revenue as mentioned above, but also completes this result by showing 
that for a certain level of optimism the bank is better off when the intermediary signal is bad 
than when the intermediary signal is good. Take for example the case where  i.e. the 
case where through the renegotiation procedure the bank knows for certain that whatever the 
final result of the project she will be entirely repaid. This is not the case when the signal is 
good since there is still a probability of  that the project will fail and the bank will only 
obtain . As a matter of facts this result does not only concern the case where 
There is an optimism level, noted , above which bad projects become less risky for 
the bank then good ones. It is indeed the level that verifies the following 
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equality: . At this point we present this level of optimism only graphically 
(Figure 5) but a calculation of the value of  when  is uniformly distributed is developed in 
Appendix 3.  
  
 
Figure 5 : Expected revenue of the bank at t=1 : 
In case of a good signal ( ) in case of a bad signal ( ). 
 
 
 
 What is more interesting for us is the implication of this result. The existing literature 
seems to agree that banks are quite aware of the existence of optimists among entrepreneurs. 
Never the less the level of credit rationing generally observed is quite low. Our model allows 
to partially explain this incoherence: as we have shown the bank can protect itself from credit 
risk by exploiting the asymmetry of beliefs between the two entrepreneurs and herself. Along 
with the argument of “lazy banks” of Manove and al. (2000) if the bank anticipates this 
protection she will have fewer incentives to monitor the projects that are presented to it. 
Moreover, we show that when the level of entrepreneurial optimism is high the bank may 
even prefer projects that are more likely to be in distress rather than projects which would be 
more likely to generate good intermediary signal. 
   
 At last, this allows us to reconsider the cost of credit the bank is going to  apply to its 
clients. Quite intuitively we can expect that banks, which are protected from risk whatever 
the quality of the project, are willing to provide cheap financing. This idea has been 
confirmed by many empirical studies showing that bank loans are often less expensive than 
other sources of finance.  
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B.    The trade loan 
 
 The trade supplier’s anticipation at the moment of the credit grant are a little more 
complex. As a matter of fact, the entrepreneurial optimism that he sees as the difference in 
beliefs between the bank and himself (due to the bank’s “pessimism”) can have a double 
effect on his subjective expected profit: a positive one in the case of a good signal and a 
globally negative one in the case of a bad intermediary signal. 
 
 In order to demonstrate this let us go back to the equation (8), describing the expected 
profit of financiers at t=0. As far as CC is concerned, the first part of the right hand side of 
this equation is positively correlated to the level of optimism since:  
 
     (11) 
 
 The second part of this equation, that is the expected profit in case of a bad signal 
does not show a univocal relation between the level of optimism and the expected profit of 
CC. As we have seen before, for a low or intermediary level of optimism (as long as 
) CC has, from his subjective point of view, zero expected profit. The impact of 
optimism (“difference in beliefs”) is than negative since it induces him to makes concessions. 
More precisely, the supplier believes that his divergence in beliefs with the bank forces him 
to give up on his future revenues. On the other hand, for a high level of optimism the amount 
of concessions that he needs to make is fixed. The bigger the difference between his and the 
bank’s beliefs, the more he has the feeling that concessions are low compared to his expected 
revenue. In other words, the stronger the bias of the supplier, the more the part of revenues he 
needs to leave to the bank compared to his total expected revenues is relatively small. The 
effect of overestimating future revenues wins over the effect of concession making. We can 
see all of these elements in the equation of the suppliers expected profit at t=0.  
 
(12) 
       Positive linear effect   Negative effect          Positive effect of optimism with  
           of optimism            of optimism             
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 Another issue showed by the expected profit equation concerns the incentive of the 
supplier to scan the projects he finances. Being aware of the divergence in beliefs that he will 
potentially have with other financers, CC is probably more motivated than the bank to select 
the projects with higher , that is projects that are less likely to be in distress. In particular, 
this is true when the general optimism level (“bank’s pessimism” for CC) is moderate.  For a 
very strong level of optimism the supplier might anticipate positive revenues whatever the 
signal.   
  
 More generally, this result reveals the ambiguity that we can observe in financial 
relationships between firms and their suppliers. Some empirical studies such as Peterson and 
Rajan (1997) and Franks and Sussman (2005) evidence that while in situation of financial 
distress commercial suppliers support the company and increase their credits, at the initial 
financing moment they propose costly loans and are quite selective in the credit grant 
decision. The anticipations of concessions in case of bad signal might be at the origin of high 
credit prices even for optimistic suppliers who actually overestimate the probability of 
success.  
 
III.  Conclusion 
 A great part of the existing literature argues that entrepreneurial optimism has 
negative effects and financiers are often the first to bear the consequences of this bias. Our 
model proposes a less clear-cut result. Ignoring the direct impact of optimism on operational 
decisions, we show that in the case of financial distress this bias may actually be a source of 
advantage for realistic financiers. Several empirical implications follow from our model:   
- When the level of optimism is high bank loans are expected to be weakly rationed 
whatever the quality of applicants. This result is easy to explain: banks feel protected in case 
of financial distress and this protection is not uniquely due to provided guaranties 
10
 but also 
to the possibility to extract concessions from the entrepreneur or his supplier, who both 
wrongly believe the project needs to be saved. At a high level of optimism the bank may even 
prefer bad projects to good ones (by entirely expropriating the entrepreneurs the bank may 
obtain a higher level of probability of success with a bad project than with a good one).  
                                                 
10 Manove et Padilla (1999) argue that an optimistic entrepreneur would provide higher collateral since he is convinced that 
there is little chance to actually give this collateral away to the bank.  
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- In the case of financial distress banks are expected to have a strict attitude and 
retrieve their claims while commercial suppliers would be more supportive towards firms 
lending them additional funds. As a matter of fact we explain the tough attitude of banks in 
case of financial distress as a strategic behavior allowing her to expropriate agents with 
biased beliefs.  
- In a context of strong entrepreneurial optimism, objectively insolvent companies 
can temporarily be saved through a private renegotiation procedure. In other words, projects 
that should objectively be liquidated for the sake of all actors can survive only because of the 
optimistic bias of some of them. Moreover, a large number of studies provide some evidence 
about fact that most of the firms who have survived financial distress through renegotiation 
procedures have mere performances and are often liquidated shortly after. Hotchkiss (1995) 
examines for example the operational performance of companies during three years following 
the renegotiation procedure and he concludes that 75% of these have significantly less good 
results than their direct concurrence. More recently Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2008) 
confirmed this result and showed that most of these companies stayed over indebted three 
years later. By modeling the survivor of unsustainable projects we propose some explanation 
of this weak performance. Quite logically when a project which was not good enough to 
avoid liquidation avoids it, its further performance is very likely to be bad. 
 Even when realistic financiers are completely aware of the entrepreneurs’ 
optimistic bias, there would not be credit rationing and projects would not be liquidated at the 
socially optimal moment. This prediction comes as response to a very important question: if 
we can explain the too high intensity of venture creation by the fact that nascent 
entrepreneurs are often too optimistic (Cooper and al., 1988), how can we explain that these 
optimists obtain external finance and are thereby supported in this venture creation? A priori, 
there is no reason to believe that financial institutions (such as banks) also suffer from an 
optimism bias. Our model shows that banks finance optimistic entrepreneurs or firms because 
it may be in their interest to do so. Once again this model analyses only one side of the coin, 
we ignore the optimism effect on permanent managerial behavior (operational decisions, 
investments, etc.).  
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Appendix 
 Appendix 1: The bank’s loan seniority 
 
 In our basic model we have supposed that the bank’s loan is senior so in case of 
liquidation the bank has rights on the totality of the liquidation value. This assumption is too 
strong; Vilanova (2004) shows that in case of renegotiation with two claimers whose claims 
have different priority, the senior lender can expropriate the junior one because the latest has 
nothing to lose if he renegotiates ( he is too weakly protected in case of liquidation). This 
means that a renegotiation procedure could be possible in our model even when all the 
players have the same beliefs. Therefore we need to verify if the effects of optimism persist 
in case of paru passu loans.  
   
 Note  the proportion of value obtained in case of liquidation by the financier , 
with  Actually,   corresponds to the part of the total debt due to the claimer , 
that is for instance  and since the entrepreneur did not participate to the initial 
financing we can write  It is logical to expect that with this new distribution of 
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the liquidation value the participation and incentive constraints would be different. The 
bank’s incitation constraint and the supplier’s participation constraints would be:   
   (A.1.1)  
       (A.1.2) 
 
 On the other hand the entrepreneur’s situation does not change since he still obtains 
nothing in the case of liquidation. Based on these new constraints we can write the four 
threshold levels of premature repayment:  
- , the minimal amount accepted by the bank 
- ,  the maximal amount demanded by the bank 
- , the maximal amount of funds CC can provide 
- , the maximal amount of funds EN can provide 
Thus, we can directly deduce the optimism levels corresponding to the different cases 
developed in the basic model. First the company is liquidated when  so 
the minimal optimism level allowing to avoid liquidation is with 
. 
When , the entrepreneur can have three different anticipations concerning the level 
of funds he would obtain from the supplier (cf. Lemma 2). 
- , the amount of premature repayment provided to the bank is then equl to 
  
- , the amount of premature repayment provided to the bank is  
  
- , the bank obtains maximal premature repayment .  
 The level of optimism allowing to pass from the first to the second case is the one that 
certifies , that is  while the level of optimism 
allowing the bank to obtain  is  
  The main result of this extension is the following: when both claims are of same 
priority, the effects of optimism on the renegotiation procedure are weaker since:  
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- , a higher level of optimism is necessary to avoid liquidation, 
- , a higher level of optimism is necessary to obtain high premature repayment,  
- , a higher level of optimism is necessary to obtain maximal premature 
repayment. 
 To resume, we show hereby that two different elements have equally oriented effects 
on the renegotiation procedure:  
 The weak protection of junior claimers 
 The entrepreneurial optimism 
 
Appendix 2: The supplier’s bargaining power  
  
 This extension tests the basic model without the assumption that the supplier has no 
bargaining power against the entrepreneur. Therefore we will no longer consider that equals 
1, but we will model the general case where   . 
 When he has some bargaining power the supplier can refuse the demand of additional 
funds from the entrepreneur and bargain. This means that he will no longer systematically 
provide . Note the amount of additional funds the entrepreneur will demand . Likely 
to the bank’s in the first phase, the goal of the entrepreneur in the second phase of the 
renegotiation would now be to demand an amount of additional funds such that the supplier is 
at least indifferent between accepting and bargaining. 
      (A.2.1) 
 The main difference with the basic model case is that now the entrepreneur can no 
longer anticipate the exact amount of funds he will obtain from the supplier as long as he 
doesn’t know the amount of pre mature repayment he needs to provide to the bank. In other 
words the amount of concessions the entrepreneur will obtain from the supplier is contingent 
on the amount of premature repayment he agreed to with the bank. Thus, at the first phase of 
the renegotiation the entrepreneur can only anticipate the proportion of total amount of 
premature repayment provided by the supplier without knowing its exact amount. 
 The left hand side of the equation (A.2.1) is the expected revenue of the supplier if he 
accepts the entrepreneur’s offer; the right hand side is his expected revenue if he bargains and 
with a probability of  gets to subject the majority of the premature repayment on the 
entrepreneur’s account. Developing this equation we obtain a primary idea about the level of 
the supplier’s concessions. 
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     (A.2.2) 
Based on this the entrepreneur can, as previously, make two types of anticipations:  
1.) , the additional funds provided by the supplier are not sufficient to avoid 
liquidation. In this case, similarly as in the basic model, in order to be accepted the 
initial amount demanded from the bank should verify the following equality: 
    (A.2.3) 
Consequently, the first possible amount of premature repayment is: 
 
2.) , the case where the entrepreneur bargains and aims to reduce the level of 
premature repayment to the amount of additional funds provided by the supplier only: 
    (A.2.4) 
So the second possible amount of premature repayment is: . 
 We can now return to the anticipations concerning the second phase and calculate the 
exact amount of additional funds provided by the supplier. In the first case, with  
this amount would be: 
     (A.2.5) 
 In the second case, with , the amount of the supplier’s concessions is: 
     (A.2.6) 
 To resume, the entrepreneur can have two possible anticipations about the additional 
funds he would be able to obtain at the phase 2 of the renegotiation: one that implies his own 
concessions and one which doesn’t (if he is the last player to make an offer to the bank). His 
behavior during the first phase of the renegotiation depends on these anticipations and the 
bank will make an initial offer based on all these parameters. 
Lemma 3: When there is a renegotiation procedure and every actor holds some bargaining 
power, the initial demand of the bank such that the entrepreneur would accept it is:  
(iv)   when the suppliers concessions are enough to cover the bank’s 
maximal demand, so the entrepreneur does not negotiate,   
(v)  if the entrepreneur bargains and aims to reduce the level of 
premature repayment to the supplier’s concessions only 
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                            Figure 7: Supplier’s expected revenue when . 
     CC’s subjective expected revenue when s=g and ,  
       CC’s subjective expected revenue when s=g and , 
       CC’s objective expected revenue when s=g and   
       CC’s objective loss due to the renegotiation procedure   
     CC’s subjective gain due to the renegotiation procedure 
 
(vi)  , when the entrepreneur bargains aiming to 
reduce the amount of premature repayment to the minimal level allowing to avoid 
liquidation  
 Of course when  the bank liquidates the company without 
renegotiations. Analogically, the threshold levels of optimism become: 
- , the level of optimism necessary to avoid liquidation  
- , the level of optimism allowing for the 
bank’s repayment amount to pass from  to   
- , the level of optimism allowing the 
bank to obtain a premature repayment protecting her entirely against risk. 
Both financiers expected profits follow these changes in the threshold optimism level. We 
present in Figure 6 the expected revenue of the bank in case of a bad signal and we put the 
accent of the loss of value for the bank induced by the supplier’s possibility to bargain. 
 
 
Figure 6 : Bank’s expected revenue when 
     B’s subjective expected revenue when s=g and ,  
B’s subjective expected revenue when s=g and ,  
B’s objective gain due to the renegotiation procedure   
B’s objective loss due to the supplier’s possibility to bargain 
 
 
 As we can see, the bank’s expected revenue is only weakly affected by this 
distribution of bargaining powers. The lack of revenue coming from the supplier’s weaker 
contribution is partly covered by larger concessions on the entrepreneur’s side. 
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 On the other hand, the suppliers expected revenue is significantly different when the 
latest doesn’t always bring in maximal additional funds. His expected revenues are positive 
much more often than in the case where he couldn’t refuse the entrepreneur’s demand (cf. 
Figure 7). The general impact is that the supplier has now less the feeling that his divergence 
in beliefs with the bank is negative for him. In other words, more bargaining power would 
dissuade the supplier to closely select projects he finances.   
 Appendix 3: Value of  for a uniformly distributed  
 Suppose  is a uniformly distributed variable, with  We need to 
calculate the value of  such that  is true. We start by writing the 
probability that  belongs to one of the domains distinguished previously: 
  
 
)=  
 . 
  We can now write that  corresponds to the value of  that verifies the following 
equality: 
    (A.3.1) 
ha
ls
hs
-0
05
91
05
9,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 6
 M
ay
 2
01
1
